Berger goes further, finding in Stevens's last poems not only involution and estrangement from the "real," but a sense of revulsion and a strategic disparagement of the earlier work. "Writing against the weight of his own past accomplishments," Berger writes, Stevens tested the resiliency of both his poetry and his creative spirit (166). Yet for Harold Bloom, "The Auroras of Autumn," written in 1947, when Stevens was sixty-eight, is the poet's "masterwork," his great contribution to the "American Sublime" (Introduction 10). Bloom-famously alive to poetry's agonistic energiesseems to find no sense of repudiation in the twilight of Stevens's writing, although he identifies the presence of Stevens's "deepest creative anxieties" in the elegiac "Dutch Graves in Bucks County," "set so desperately against time's 'it was'" (Wallace Stevens 220). B. J. Leggett recognizes the shift in tone and preoccupation between early and late Stevens, but discovers in The Rock (pace Schjeldahl) a newly spare, stripped-back style after the peak obscurity and abstraction of The Auroras of Autumn (see Leggett 62) .
The ongoing critical project to derive a narrative of creative evolution, ascendency, and diminution arises from a deep anxiety, shared by poets and critics alike, as to the role of time in the life of creativity. In his 1932 Norton Lectures, Eliot (who was both) ruminates on the creative contours in the lives of his antecedent writers, marveling at Yeats's continuing lyric bravery and vigor as "a great triumph of development" (P 4: 679). In contrast, Eliot describes Coleridge as "a ruined man," haunted by the loss of his creative power and "condemned to know that the little poetry he had written was worth more than all he could do with the rest of his life" (P 4: 626) .
Time is, of course, both a creator and destroyer of poetry. The development of creative mastery takes place within and across a temporal span, but so too does an inevitable degeneration of creative power-this much is truistic. The knowledge that the struggle to sustain creative vitality is terminal shadows all writers' creative lives with an acute compounding of mortality. In 1947, after the completion of his last great poetic works, Eliot gave an address, "On Poetry," in which he confesses to a horrified doubt as to the resilience of his creative powers:
I have always been haunted by one or the other of two doubts. The first is, that nothing I have written is really of permanent value. . . . But the second doubt is still more distressing. I sometimes feel that some, at least, of what I have written, is very good, but that I shall never again write anything good. . . . At least three times during my life, and for periods of some duration, I have been convinced that I shall never again be able to write anything worth reading. And perhaps this time it is true. (qtd. in Smidt 31) In addition to the weight of that "never again"-expressed earlier in theological guise in "Gerontion": "After such knowledge, what forgiveness?" (PTSE 32) 2 -Eliot goes on to express his fear that he will suffer an infirmity of self-awareness, becoming oblivious to the loss of his creative power. Both the momentary power of the poem as action and the enduring facility of the poet's knowledge are thus imperiled by an undefined but fatal form of loss. Yet, as evidenced by his view of Yeats as having triumphed, there is a whiff of the strategic underlying Eliot's meditations, a sense that some exertion of the will might serve to keep the poet in touch with his creative powers.
The struggle to sustain creativity across a lifetime might be said to occur with particular intensity in relation to poetry, because at the level of the individual composition poetry's predominantly nonlinear forms of thought subordinate the structuring logic of narrative to the monadic force of the moment. In their meditations on the processes of composition, Eliot and Stevens each, at times, threaten to succumb to the seductions of the epiphanic. Stevens's "occasional ecstasy" and "sense of purification" (CPP 665, 674) is the more positively sensual counterpart to Eliot's "efflux of poetry" (P 4: 685). For Eliot, poetic composition is a state of momentary liberation "characterised by the sudden lifting of the burden of anxiety and fear . . . the breaking down of strong habitual barriers-which tend to reform very quickly" (P 4: 686). For Stevens, the experience of writing a poem is "of no less a degree than the experience of the mystic. . . . In this state of elevation we feel perfectly adapted to the idea that moves and l'oiseau qui chante" (CPP 674).
Without wishing to elide their deep philosophical divergences, nor to propose an equivalence between poets of radically different temperaments, I want to suggest that something approaching a principle of complementarity develops between Eliot's and Stevens's late poetic struggle to overcome the stasis of the aging imagination. That Stevens was the more successful, there can be no question: Eliot's poetic gifts recede after Four Quartets, replaced by a strained entry into verse drama and moral criticism. In contrast, Stevens wrote poetry of pellucid brilliance up until his death. His late poems continue to strive toward "A new knowledge of reality" (CPP 452). Yet there are resonances between these poets' late attempts to mediate between the lyrical flights of lines like Stevens's "The far-fire flowing and the dim-coned bells" and the "difficult objects" of "The eye's plain version" (CPP 397).
Consider the opening strains of Eliot's "Burnt Norton" (1936) Stevens's second canto rings its changes on a single sentence whose triadic recursions are founded on the root words "impalpable" and "bells." Its gently modulating syntax shifts through a series of pulses that "seem to move / In the movement of the colors of the mind" (CPP 397). Eliot's "Burnt Norton" performs a similar motion. Its speculations turn and turn again on "time" and "present," and its enactment of mental process is similarly self-conscious ("My words echo / Thus, in your mind" [PTSE 179] ). Both poets become more abstract as they try to find words to signal what cannot be spoken. Both find in the falling rhythms of their multisyllabic meditations a means of turning from the ambition and ravishments of poetry. Compare the iterative play of reason and perception in Stevens's "inconstant objects of inconstant cause / In a universe of inconstancy" (CPP 337) with Eliot's "Distracted from distraction by distraction," from "Burnt Norton" (PTSE 182). For both Stevens and Eliot, the essence of poetic imagination inheres in the interrelation between a concentrated attention to the miracle of the momentary and an acknowledgement of the necessity of repetition and accretion as the lived dynamics of ordinary experience. Eliot's essay "The Metaphysical Poets" (1921) famously advocates for the importance of poetic reflection upon and amalgamation of the mundane as a means of reconciling (as he put it elsewhere) "the man who suffers and the mind which creates" (P 2: 109):
When a poet's mind is perfectly equipped for its work, it is constantly amalgamating disparate experience; the ordinary man's experience is chaotic, irregular, fragmentary. The latter falls in love, or reads Spinoza, and these two experiences have nothing to do with each other, or with the noise of the typewriter or the smell of cooking; in the mind of the poet these experiences are always forming new wholes. (P 2: 380) It is no coincidence that Eliot and Stevens shared an interest in the philosophy of Henri Bergson, with its temporal multiplicity and its distinction between the mechanistic construct of elapsing "clock time" and the lived experience of temporal fluidity (la durée réelle). As Stevens puts it, "Poetry is the imagination of life. A poem is a particular of life thought of for so long that one's thought has become an inseparable part of it" (CPP 684).
There is a-perhaps surprising-affinity between Stevens's description of reveling in those "crystallizations of freshness" that are the mind's accumulations of its imaginings of life (CPP 684), and Eliot's lingering over images with a "personal saturation value" (P 4: 687) that reappear years later "charged with great imaginative pressure" ("There is so much memory in imagination") (P 4: 632). In both instances, the poet conceptualizes poetry's telos as a synchronic culmination of the temporal nature of experience.
In Wallace Stevens and the Demands of Modernity, Charles Altieri asks of Stevens's critics that they "develop richer concrete yet speculative accounts of what is at stake as his poetry attunes self-reflexively to the quickenings of sense it establishes" (235). Implied within Altieri's gerundive syntax are the difficulty and fascination of such a challenge: both Stevens's poetry and his writing of it enact a continuous process of quickening and attunement that (thankfully) never achieves a stability in which to ground a dialectic. How, then, can we trace the play of liberation and constraint in the late-career poems? What mediation between those benighted terms "reality" and "imagination" is rendered possible, and by what strategies? In its lyric intensity, transitivity, and particularity, and its insistence on the significance of the moment, the theatrum mundi of Stevens's poetry is inimical to the flow of the quotidian. Stevens suggests in "Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction" that in the poem the world "will have stopped revolving except in crystal" (CPP 351). Eliot's late lyrics revolve around the crystalline paradox of the moment in and out of time, the "white light still and moving, / Erhebung without motion" (PTSE 181) . But what, then, of the fallow time in which poetry is not possible? In the wake of its creative exertions, the mind finely attuned to momentary experience must struggle to accommodate the tedium and attrition of the everyday. In thinking through these questions in relation to Stevens's later poetry, I wish to focus on the period from 1942 to 1955. 1942 was the year in which Stevens wrote "Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction." His Collected Poems was published in 1954, including the final section of twenty-five previously uncollected poems making up The Rock. The timespan includes the composition (1947) (1948) (1949) of the poems in The Auroras of Autumn, published in 1950 when Stevens was seventy, and the writing and publication of The Necessary Angel, published in 1951. The poems and essays written during these years attest to Stevens's intense creative uncertainty, and bear marks of what Jack Baker rightly calls "the trials that fomented Stevens's mature poetry" (299). I suggest that what is at stake in these late poems-particularly "Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction" (1942) , "An Ordinary Evening in New Haven" (1949) , and "The Plain Sense of Things" (1952)-is a matter of teleology: an enabling recognition of the temporal inevitability of the imagination, and a resultant turn toward the "plain." For Stevens, living "in a world of the imagination, . . . reality and contact with it are the great blessings" (L 753). Helen Vendler remarks on Stevens's "gradual passage from an aesthetic of the beautiful to an aesthetic of the arranged" (6) . This seems to me to be another way of recognizing Stevens's mature awareness of artifice not as an agent of the grandiose but as an innate and humanizing feature of lived consciousness. A related impulse toward divestiture manifests in the ascetic and bathetic elements of Eliot's late poetry.
Eliot's relatively sparse late poetry is dominated by his long-poem cycles, collected in Four Quartets and written between 1935 and 1942. Although The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism was written several years before the first of the Quartets, its reflective tone and emphasis on retrospection clearly mark it as the work of Eliot's final phase as a critic of poetry-together with the valedictory On Poetry and Poets (1957)-before he would turn to writing plays and social criticism. Strangely, given how much the two poets differ in other respects, accounts of Eliot's later poetry have tended to find a surrender to abstraction, as in the extended meditation on time past and present at the opening of "Burnt Norton," that echoes critiques of Stevens's work. Roger Bellin, for example, asks, "How are we to take seriously the conceptual discourse that makes up so much of T. S. Eliot's Four Quartets?" (421) . Even more strikingly, both Eliot's and Stevens's late poems have been read as deliberately self-defeating. James Longenbach observes that Stevens's aesthetic in the late 1940s and early 1950s has repeatedly been constructed as "one of retreat or mere aestheticism" (Wallace Stevens 279). Charles Berger goes so far as to say that "The Plain Sense of Things" "seems almost to court the sense of being too weak to live up to past victories" (166)-victories over what, one wonders?
The middle Quartets carry notes of disavowal similar to that detected by Berger in relation to Stevens's late poetry when he claims that "Stevens indulges in the great poet's right of retractio and disparagement" (166). The voice of Eliot's "East Coker" states simply that "The poetry does not matter" (PTSE 187). Such epigrammatic pronouncements are interspersed in canto II with thuddingly self-conscious disquisitions on the difficulties of poetic expression ("That was a way of putting it-not very satisfactory" [PTSE 187]). With its prosaic descriptions of the consolations of "a very good dinner" (PTSE 196) , the second section of "The Dry Salvages" presents such a failure of tone that some critics (notably Donald Davie and Hugh Kenner) have been led to suppose this a deliberate strategy of aesthetic frustration. Davie appealed in 1956 for an explanation of how the poet of "Burnt Norton" should come to write "in such stumbling trundling rhythms, these inarticulate ejaculations of reach-me-down phrases, the debased currency of the study circle" ("T. S. Eliot" 16) .
3 Davie reproduces this passage in a 1991 essay in PN Review, where he rescinds his earlier reading:
We were meant to notice (so my argument went) that the tone had gone wrong, and to ask ourselves why the poet had engineered such wrongness. All this part of my essay now seems to me quite implausible. The material that the poet dredged up when he remembered his boyhood was too intimate for him to maintain decorum in speaking about it. This is the most straightforward explanation, and also the most compassionate. (25) For my part, Davie's more recent explanation is much the more persuasive. Eliot never achieved any sense of assurance in matters of tone, and the problem became particularly acute when he abandoned the polyvocality of his earlier long poems (as Davie suggests). The apparently univocal long poem immediately presents formal difficulties in relation to the risk of monotony and the need for relief, which may in part account for the impersonal, speculative idiom both Eliot and Stevens at times employed. Stevens admitted of "An Ordinary Evening in New Haven" that, "like most long poems," it was "merely a collection of short ones" (L 640). Longenbach includes Stevens among the modern American poets who found themselves in "the war poet's predicament: a generation of lyric poets had been pushed despite themselves to make an epic statement" ("Stevens" 83), and refers to the seeming irreconcilability of "epic ambition" and "lyric concision" (82). Such was also Eliot's predicament as an American poet living through the Great War and then the London Blitz. During his war-shadowed effort to compose "East Coker," Eliot told Stephen Spender on September 11, 1939, that "It doesn't seem to me to matter very much whether, at the moment, it is or isn't very good. The important thing is to keep going." He was seeking, he told Spender, "a smaller theme-perhaps family life-which had all the implications of what is going on in the world outside" (PTSE 927).
But more than this, Eliot's awkward pronouncements in canto II of "East Coker" should be read as misfired attempts at a form of spiritualized bathos amounting to metaphysical self-defeat:
There is, it seems to us, At best, only a limited value In the knowledge derived from experience. The knowledge imposes a pattern, and falsifies, For the pattern is new in every moment And every moment is a new and shocking Valuation of all we have been.
(PTSE 187)
These lines precede the Dantean descent through "a dark wood" into the third canto, with its famous apophatic invocation "O dark dark dark" (PTSE 188). It makes no sense for a poetic voice moving toward the via negativa to adopt a tone of hauteur in lecturing the reader. Rather, this is the voice of the poet speaking words of caution to himself. Acknowledging his own yearning for the "Long hoped for calm, the autumnal serenity" and wisdom of age (PTSE 187), the poet is alert to the temptations and consolations of the dissembling imagination. These lines manifest a supplicant's plea for epiphany, the renewing shock of the moment. Unable to rid itself of the catechistic cadences of Choruses from "The Rock" (1934), the poem's failure of tone partially obscures its kinship with earlier poems of equinoctial foreclosure, such as Shakespeare's Sonnet 73, with its "Bare ruin'd choirs," or Coleridge's "Dejection: An Ode." Seamus Perry describes the latter as a "poem which grows from the impossibility of poetry," one that "stands at the head of a long tradition of modern verse which discovers imaginative power in the course of lamenting imaginative desolation" (245). Eliot's "East Coker" is not consistent in its commitments, but it is striking that a poet as fastidious as Eliot has recourse to "Dung and death" in the culminating formulation of his spiritual and cultural antecedents. His vision of "Earth feet, loam feet" in "clumsy shoes," "living in the living seasons" (PTSE 186), initiates a shift away from the mythologizing and the urbane world of his early poetry in an attempt to guard against the "fear" and "folly" of old men (PTSE 188). Eliot's exercises in humility, his allegorical elevation of the Somerset paysans and his turn (continued in "Little Gidding") toward "the rough road," "the pig-sty," and "the dull façade" (PTSE 202) are as close as his doctrinally inflected vision comes to Stevens's allegiance to the literal-what George Lensing calls "the near holiness of the real" (Wallace Stevens 106).
In his recent biography of Stevens, Mariani remarks rightly, if obliquely, that the poet "cared much more for the elegiac than he did the dramatic" (100). Much has been written about Stevens's use of and resistance to the elegiac mode.
4 Jahan Ramazani, for example, argues that Stevens "embraces a general theory of the imagination that is elegiac even though in practice he resists the devices of the formal elegy," concluding that "Modern poetry . . . is for him a perpetual elegy not only for lost gods and pastoral ease but also for poetry itself" (569, 568). This reflexive relation becomes especially tortured in moments of mature creative anxiety, because the poem as object cannot act as the consolatory aesthetic substitute for the lost original in the presence of its creator's distrust in his aesthetic powers. The uncertain older poet of the elegiac imagination is thus caught in a vicious cycle of loss: it is in the very attempt to recoup the loss of past creativity (via the act of writing) that such loss becomes fully manifest. The commitment to an anti-creative plainness that Stevens shares with Eliot presents a form of relief from the burden of this paradox.
Both poets evinced a need to avoid stasis. For Stevens, the "supreme fiction" is predicated on constant evolution, and "the distaste we feel for this withered scene // Is that it has not changed enough" (CPP 337). For the post-conversion Eliot, only the Eternal is unchanging. To be human is to be "in time's covenant," in perpetual search of "the intersection of the timeless moment" (PTSE 201, 202) . The logic of retrospectivity that both accepts the present as denuded of force or meaning in some vital respect and refuses the false consolation of aesthetic repetition produces in Eliot's and Stevens's late work an emphasis on plainness as a strategic means of recovering from the loss or diminution of creativity that cannot be mourned. It is thus with a certain stoic relief that Stevens affirms his desire for
The poem of pure reality, untouched By trope or deviation, straight to the word, Straight to the transfixing object, . . . Both Stevens and Eliot found in the cyclical accretion and winnowing of the seasons a dynamic metaphor for the plain-sighted backward gaze made necessary by mature acknowledgement of the "faithfulness of reality" (CPP 403). Compare their respective juxtaposition of winter and spring, those "cold copulars" from which "the particulars of rapture" arise (CPP 339). Stevens's imagination, "which in the midst of summer stops // To imagine winter" (CPP 360), has its counterpart in Eliot's "Midwinter spring" that baulks at "the unimaginable / Zero summer" (PTSE 201). The shared seasonal thematics of their late poem-cycles speak to a deeper set of consonances. Because each poet is seeking after a form of actualizing memory while shying from the elegiac, they share a late preoccupation with seasonality as a pattern of involution without evolution ("Because I do not hope to turn again . . .
" [PTSE 87]).
Lensing calls Stevens's seasonal cycles "the dominant metaphor of his work" ("The Seasons" 67). Certainly, Transport to Summer (1947) initiates a seasonal pattern, with "Credences of Summer" forming a counterpart to "The Auroras of Autumn" in the following collection. Stevens explained to a correspondent that from the time of his composing "Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction" he turned to "Credences of Summer" as a means of reckoning with reality: "At the time when that poem was written my feeling for the necessity of a final accord with reality was at its strongest: reality was the summer of the title of the book in which the poem appeared" (L 719). Leggett sees "Credences" as the poem that "signals a change in its attempt to depict a reality beyond the mind" (63): "Let's see the very thing and nothing else" (CPP 322). The poem begins, as "Notes" has it, to "reason of these things with later reason" (CPP 346). Its logic of retroactivity works toward what Altieri calls "the aesthetic distance necessary to see the world steadily and see it whole" ("Why" 152). Canto II yearns for the sun "Without evasion by a single metaphor," and celebrates "the barrenness / Of the fertile thing that can attain no more" (CPP 322-23). This dynamic, at once reflective and proleptic, substitutes a temporal interplay for the self-delighting irony and polyphonic energies of Stevens's early work.
The poem that most clearly exemplifies the generative possibility of the poet's fallow time is "The Plain Sense of Things," which Stevens wrote in the fall of 1952. During the period of its composition, Stevens wrote in a letter dated October 8, 1952 , "This morning I walked around in the park . . . and felt as blank as one of the ponds which in the weather at this time of year are motionless. But perhaps it was the blankness that made me enjoy it so much" (L 762). Ever the aesthete, Stevens is able to locate the sensual qualities of respite in the leaden blankness of the ponds. The relief apparent in Eliot's "East Coker" is, in contrast, the relief of an ascetic sensibility shriven of the burden of perception in the encompassing darkness of the void. Yet Eliot's influence is unmistakable in Stevens's poem. "After the leaves have fallen, we return / To a plain sense of things. It is as if / We had come to an end of the imagination" (CPP 428). The tentative syntax, hesitancy of tone, and the balancing of exploration and recursion recall the first section of Eliot's "Little Gidding":
If you came this way in may time, you would find the hedges White again, in May, with voluptuary sweetness. It would be the same at the end of the journey. . . .
(PTSE 201)
Stevens's "blank cold, this sadness without cause" (CPP 428), exists in a melancholia like "the dark cold and the empty desolation" that ends "East Coker" (PTSE 192) . The poem's narrative of diminution ("The great structure has become a minor house. / . . . a repetition / In a repetitiousness of men and flies" [CPP 428]) follows the ritualized diminutions of "Gerontion" and "Little Gidding" ("Dust inbreathed was a house-/ The wall, the wainscot and the mouse" [PTSE 203]). And behind Stevens's greenhouse that "never so badly needed paint" (CPP 428), with its decrepit, slanting chimney, seems to lie Eliot's "Marina," with its dilapidated sailboat ("The garboard strake leaks, the seams need caulking" [PTSE 108]). Here Eliot and Stevens find a common language in their attempts to articulate the central paradox of poetic anti-creation. In both instances, the desired object-that which might otherwise be recuperated through the substitutions of elegy-lies in either an irrecoverable past or a future beyond the reach of the poet. Acknowledging this, the poetic imagination fixes its attention on detailed observation of the processes of degeneration in the natural world. In doing so, it makes poetry possible by creating distance between the perceiving self and the fundamental loss it has encountered. Hence the attention paid to the "rat come out to see, / The great pond and its waste of the lilies" (CPP 428). As Eliot found in the "images" that "return" in "Marina" (PTSE 107), such concentrated attention at times attains the status of clairvoyance, an epiphany of the future that-like Simeon-the poet may envision but not witness. To Stevens's "the absence of the imagination had / Itself to be imagined" (CPP 428), we might add his notebook comment that "Perhaps there is a degree of perception at which what is real and what is imagined are one: a state of clairvoyant observation, accessible or possibly accessible to the poet or, say, the acutest poet" (CPP 906) .
This logic of the clear-sighted imagination begins to be developed in Stevens's essay "The Figure of the Youth as Virile Poet," where he describes the "life that the youth as virile poet lives, in a kind of radiant and productive atmosphere." The youthful accord that the poet achieves in Stevens's vision is a form of cosmic euphony, "a pleasure of agreement with the radiant and productive world in which he lives" (CPP 678). This is a version of poetry in "agreement with reality," but it is the reality of a green imagination, an "incandescence" beyond the "gaunt world of the reason" (CPP 679, 680, 679). Stevens was sixty-four when he wrote this essay in the summer of 1943, "composing as the body tires" (CPP 333). It may perhaps seem strange for a poet entering the late phase of his poetic development to alight on a figure of such sexual vigor and ease through which to describe the process of writing poetry. But Stevens's virile poet is commensurate with his time of trial insofar as it functions as an avatar of "the intelligence that endures" (CPP 675), combining the "acute intelligence of the imagination, the illimitable resources of its memory, [and] its power to possess the moment it perceives" into the signal flame of a closing era burning before the exhalation of the next phase of history. The imagination "colors, increases, brings to a beginning and end, invents languages, crushes men and, for that matter, gods in its hands" (CPP 681).
By making explicit in this wartime passage his evocation of Aeneas carrying Anchises on his shoulders, Stevens situates his "virile poet" in typological relation to the phases of individual and cultural renewal brought about by a reckoning with tradition. In Virgil's account of the fall of Troy, Aeneas fled the burning city with his son Ascanius and his father Anchises. As the elderly Anchises was too weak to walk, Aeneas bore him upon his shoulders. Anchises in turn carried a vessel containing his ancestors' ashes. Thus, Aeneas bears the symbolic sum of his legacy away from the ruined city and, eventually, into the founding of Rome. The story is Stevens's allegory of imaginative self-realization in the course of a necessary recalibration to the attrition of external events. He finds imaginative regeneration in the sense of an ending: "It is one of the peculiarities of the imagination that it is always at the end of an era. . . . It is not that there is a new imagination but that there is a new reality" (CPP 656). And he attributes to the Aenean figure of the poet the culture-hero's renewed power to "delineat[e] with accurate speech the complications of which it is composed" (CPP 675).
Early in his poetic career, Eliot wrote that "the conscious present" manifests "an awareness of the past in a way and to an extent which the past's awareness of itself cannot show," continuing, "Someone said: 'The dead writers are remote from us because we know so much more than they did.' Precisely, and they are that which we know" (P 2: 107-08). Stevens's vision of the poet as Aenean culture-hero recognizes, like Eliot, the composite nature of the poetic consciousness. "An Ordinary Evening in New Haven" seems to me to circumambulate the confrontation with the "familiar compound ghost" of "Little Gidding" in this respect (PTSE 204). Stevens In each instance, the poetic voice must accept an invasive loss of selfhood and become almost violently dispossessed from its present moment in order to maintain the vitality of its mediations between temporal positions. Stevens had already begun working through a poetic vision of this scenario in the near-contemporary "Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction," composed in the spring of 1942 and subsequently placed as the final poem in Transport to Summer (1947) . Stevens addresses the poem to an ephebe, a young man in process of transition from the infant world of his mother and community into the adult world of duty to the polis. And, like his virile poet appearing, a "spirit out of its own self, not out of some surrounding myth" from the viaticum rites of the old gods (CPP 675), "Notes" begins with the death of the sun-god ("Phoebus is dead, ephebe") and the expulsion of the poetic voice from a world of images into the "vivid transparence" of consciousness that perceives and abides the "invented world" (CPP 329). Instead of some "voluminous master folded in his fire," there is blinding solar brightness, expressed in the radiating transparency of Stevens's blank verse:
How clean the sun when seen in its idea, Washed in the remotest cleanliness of a heaven That has expelled us and our images . . .
The death of one god is the death of all.
(CPP 329)
The poem's injunction "The sun / Must bear no name, gold flourisher, but be / In the difficulty of what it is to be" reflects the description in Stevens's critical prose of the virile poet "delineating with accurate speech the complications of which it is composed" (CPP 330, 675) . In "It Must Give Pleasure" II, the blue woman briefly takes up the mantel of Stevens's virile poet. The canto repeats the lines "It was enough for her that she remembered," at first enjambed into uncertainty across two stanzas, then later repeated in the security of its own line. The woman's activity-circumscriptive rather than denotative ("Cold, coldly delineating, being real, / Clear and, except for the eye, without intrusion" [CPP 345])-models the virile poet's project of differentiation. Revolving in difficulty and complication, this is no atmosphere of pleasure and ease, but an altogether starker frame, a metaphysical pays de travail in which the invented world of the imagination finds itself out of synchrony with its foundation in gaunt reality:
From this the poem springs: that we live in a place That is not our own and, much more, not ourselves And hard it is in spite of blazoned days.
(CPP 332) "And hard it is": the idiomatic homeliness of the formulation grounds the moment of realization, drawing it earthward from the stanza's gnomic opening. It settles in the wintry loam that, increasingly, figures the endurance of the imagination. The experience of necessary estrangement has not yet acquired the sharpness of "An Ordinary Evening in New Haven," where "The plainness of plain things is savagery" (CPP 399). The ephebe will return in canto XIII of this later poem, charged with defining "a fresh spiritual," "A coldness in a long, too-constant warmth." His appearance presages the manifest "difficulty of the visible," "The actual landscape with its actual horns" (CPP 405). "Notes" charts an arc of value from "that ever-early candor to its late plural," from "an immaculate beginning // . . . To an immaculate end" (CPP 330-31):
The poem refreshes life so that we share, For a moment, the first idea . There is a shadow of Yeats's Leanhaun Sidhe here 5 -albeit stripped of the connotations of the Gaelic twilight and its fin-de-siècle context-as the poet draws succor from an internalized "first idea" of the self (the "blood newly came") to arrive at "the freshness of ourselves" (CPP 344). Crucially, however, it is not the rich blood of the poet's origin in the dark of the Minotaur past that courses through the heart. Rather, it is the crystalline liquidity of late thought, the mineral clarity of hindsight. The poem's yearned-for entelechy, its "supreme fiction," is only to be sought in the clarifying perspective of temporal distance.
This section of "Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction" ("It Must Be Abstract" III) contains an oblique prefiguring of the presiding presence of "Angel Surrounded by Paysans," the "angel of reality" and "necessary angel of the earth" in whose sight "you see the earth again, // Cleared of its stiff and stubborn, man-locked set" (CPP 423). In "Notes," the poetic consciousness is propelled on its arc "between [two] points" (from the exhilaration of the first idea to its "late plural") by an entity whose origin and nature remains occluded (CPP 331). The cataphoric uncertainty of the signifier "It," coming as it does after an ellipsis, marks the entry of a supervening presence that "sends us, winged by an unconscious will, / To an immaculate end" (CPP 330-31). The pronoun conveys an unsettling feeling of impersonality. It might conceivably refer to the poem or to the first idea, and the passage is carefully configured so that these concepts are subsumed within whatever we determine as the agent of the following action. But the metaphoric weight of the verb "winged," juxtaposed against a "will" (however unconscious), suggests a supernal being present but unseen. In "Angel Surrounded by Paysans," the angel is similarly elusive: "A figure half seen, or seen for a moment, a man / Of the mind, an apparition" (CPP 423). This angel will not make welcome at the door until the conclusion of The Auroras of Autumn, but its winged plainness is already apparent in the imperative to candor that runs through "Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction." In canto VII, the poetic voice struggles to affirm the real: "It is possible, possible, possible. It must / Be possible. It must be that in time / The real will from its crude compoundings come," in the face of another, antagonistic angel, who, in the following canto, is cast down from "the motionless motion of his flight" (CPP 349). The "lapis-haunted air" displaced by his wings is revealed as an effusion of the poetic self, mirrored reflections, "the escapades of death" (CPP 349-50).
To discern the presence of the angel of reality in "Notes" long before its manifestation in "Angel Surrounded by Paysans" is to find the echo of the later work in the earlier, thereby adopting the same fixedly retrospective position as Benjamin's angel of history blown backwards through time. I do not wish to call too heavily on Benjamin's angel, as to do so would be to confound its more acute political purposes. Yet the dynamic of the angel's progress through time is a fitting analogue of the anti-dialectical logic of retrospectivity that characterizes Eliot's and Stevens's late poetics. The angel appears in the ninth thesis from Benjamin's essay "Theses on the Philosophy of History":
A Klee painting named "Angelus Novus" shows an angel looking as though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe that keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. The storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress. (257-58)
Benjamin's view of progress is decidedly more apocalyptic than Stevens's vision of poetic development (there are, of course, important historical and political reasons for this). 6 Stevens's angel is not propelled by the storm of progress, but rather by the elemental forces of consciousness: memory, intelligence, and the imagination. These travel through time like energy: "as a wave is a force and not the water" (CPP 665); "Like light" that "adds nothing, except itself" (CPP 681). The poet's eyes are turned to the past, but these eyes are of the present, shriven of baroque blandishments and the "meanings that we add to them" (CPP 332).
The poetic consciousness cannot anticipate the objects of its attention, because-like the angel-its back is turned to the future. Its debt to the past extends beyond patrimony to a form of sustenance: buoyed by the inexorable currents of its own progress through time, the mind sees not the phenomena themselves, but their manifestation in the world of invention with which it must come to an accommodation. So, as anticipated in "Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction," the difficultest rigor is forthwith, On the image of what we see, to catch from that Irrational moment its unreasoning, As when the sun comes rising, when the sea Clears deeply, when the moon hangs on the wall Of heaven-haven. These are not things transformed. Yet we are shaken by them as if they were. We reason about them with a later reason.
(CPP 344-45)
The poetics of relief, then, manifests as an inversion of the sublime. Instead of seeking out the epiphanic moment as a supervention upon the real, the mature poet works to see plainly the shudder of the imagination in contact with unreasoning experience. For the Eliot of Four Quartets, this work of "difficultest rigor" amounts to a penitential acceptance of earthly time as irredeemable. For Stevens, it is to "reason of these things with later reason" (CPP 346). In the face of age, loss, and the nearing horizon of creative power, Stevens wrote in "Adagia," "The final belief is to believe in a fiction, which you know to be a fiction, there being nothing else. The exquisite truth is to know that it is a fiction and that you believe in it willingly" (CPP 903). Although the form and substance of their belief remain separated by a metaphysical gulf, late Stevens and late Eliot share a sense of belief's necessity, combined with an acknowledgement of its limitations. The irrevocability of the past and the opacity of the future exert a desolate pressure on the present against which the aging imagination provides no protection. Yet-for both poets-it is precisely the turn toward plainness, the pursuit of poetry in spite of loss rather than as consolation for it, and the writing through the painful equinoctial awareness of infirmity, that humanizes the late poetic work, granting it power and poignancy.
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